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HOW DOES ENGAGEMENT RISK AND THE FOCUS OF THE PCAOB INSPECTION 
PROCESS INFLUENCE AUDITORS’ INTERNAL AUDIT RELIANCE DECISIONS? 
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 With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, external auditors face a new regulatory 
inspection process in addition to an increase in litigation (or engagement) pressure.  It has been 
communicated that this new inspection process will place an increased emphasis on the 
efficiency of integrated audits while maintaining the same level of effectiveness.  In an 
experiment, I explore how external auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function will 
be affected by different inspection focuses, varying levels of engagement risk, and the level of 
risk associated with the audit test or procedure.  While I expect that there will be significant main 
effects for inspection focus, engagement risk and the riskiness of the audit test, I explore the 
potential presence of a three-way interaction between these three factors.  My findings suggest 
that the auditor reliance decisions are impacted by differing levels of engagement risk, the focus 
of the inspection process, and the riskiness of the audit tests.  In general, as engagement risk 
increased, auditors’ reliance decreased.  Also, as the riskiness of the audit test increased, auditors 
placed less reliance on the internal audit function.  However, when the focus of the inspection 
changed, these factors interacted with one another.  Specifically, when auditors faced a focus of 
both effectiveness and efficiency, their reliance decisions increased as engagement risk and 
riskiness of the test decreased, but when auditors faced a focus of effectiveness only, their 
reliance decisions were not impacted by the engagement risk when the riskiness of the test was 
high.  Thus, the impact of engagement risk on auditors’ reliance decisions depends on the focus 
of the inspection process and the riskiness of the tests. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview of Research Question  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in 2002.  Its expressed purpose was to restore 
investor confidence following a series of corporate scandals and bankruptcies.  SOX created the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)1 to oversee external auditing and 
corporate governance issues.  The PCAOB has the authority to establish auditing standards for 
public companies and is responsible for inspecting registered public accounting firms.   
One of the major requirements of SOX is that management and the external auditor are to 
report on the adequacy of the company’s internal control over financial reporting (ICFR).  This is 
the most costly aspect of this legislation for companies to implement, since documenting and 
testing internal controls requires enormous time and effort. The additional costs of the external 
audit have also increased significantly (GAO-06-361, 2006). 
PCAOB inspections differ from the peer review process that was in place prior to SOX 
for publicly traded companies.  The PCAOB is charged “to assess the degree of compliance… 
with the Act, the rules of the Board, the rules of the Commission, or professional standards” 
(SOX section 104 part (a)).  The PCAOB has not disclosed how it chooses specific audits for 
inspection, except that its focus is on aspects of the selected audits that are most likely to present 
“challenging issues” (PCAOB, 2007 Annual Report).  Therefore, there is no basis for firms to 
know which of their audits will be selected or what issues the inspectors will be concentrating 
on.  In light of the new auditing standards on ICFR (AS5), the PCAOB has indicated that its 
inspection process will place an increased emphasis on the efficiency of integrated audits while 
maintaining the same level of effectiveness (PCAOB Release No. 104-2006-105, 2007 Annual 
                                                 
1 Also referred to as Board. 
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Report).   Auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function is likely to be affected by the focus of 
the PCAOB’s inspection process.  If the inspection focus is concerned with a more balanced 
approach between effectiveness and efficiency rather than focusing only on effectiveness, 
auditors should rely on the internal audit function more when the focus is balanced.  
In addition to facing the risks2 from the inspection process, auditors also face increased 
litigation (or engagement) pressure because of the corporate failures that lead to the passage of 
SOX.3   After the fall of one of the largest accounting firms, Arthur Andersen, public accounting 
firms are more concerned about their reputation. Monitoring engagement risk is an integral part 
of the audit process.  Research has shown that as engagement risk increases, auditors become 
more conservative (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996). Thus, under high engagement risk, auditors 
are less likely to rely on the internal audit function for audit procedures.  
The research question that I investigate is “How will auditors’ reliance decisions on the 
work of others (i.e., internal auditors)4 be affected by the competing pressures from different 
inspection focuses, varying levels of engagement risk, and the level of risk associated with the 
audit test or procedure?” While I expect that there will be significant main effects for inspection 
focus, engagement risk, and the riskiness of the audit test, the more interesting prediction is the 
potential presence of a three-way interaction between the three factors. In addition, I test whether 
auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function varies across the two major types of audit tests: 
test of controls and substantive procedures. 
1.2 Motivation of the Research Question  
SOX set new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company boards, management, 
and public accounting firms.  Debate continues over the perceived benefits and costs of SOX.  
                                                 
2 PCAOB has the authority to impose a range of disciplinary sanctions against registered accounting firms.    
3 “Auditor liability:  to cap or not to cap?” The Accountant January 31, 2007. 
4 From this point forward the “work of others” will be referred to as the internal audit function. 
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The SOX mandate with the most perceived cost was section 404, which required management to 
issue an assessment on the effectiveness of their entity’s ICFR and the entity’s external auditors 
to issue an opinion on the effectiveness of the entity’s ICFR.  
1.2.1 PCAOB Auditing Standards 
In 2004, the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard 2 (AS2) (PCAOB 2004) to provide 
guidance for auditors on how to conduct an audit of ICFR.  Almost immediately, AS2 was 
criticized by numerous parties for being too costly.5   Part of the criticism of AS2 was that it 
involved excessive auditing by requiring unnecessary procedures (i.e. walkthroughs), requiring 
internal control testing work in low risk areas, and not allowing auditors to use the internal audit 
function.  AS2 required that the auditor perform enough of the testing so that his or her own 
work provided the principal evidence supporting the auditor’s opinion. This AS2 requirement 
limited the use of the internal audit function by the external auditor (PCAOB 2004, p. 111).       
In 2007, the PCAOB responded to the criticisms that audits were too costly and not well 
integrated by issuing AS5 (PCAOB 2007).6 AS5 requires the external auditor to use a risk-based 
approach in conducting an integrated audit of ICFR and of the financial statements.7  AS5 also 
has a number of other requirements intended to reduce costs while maintaining the same level of 
effectiveness.  Under AS5, the auditor is required to use a risk-based approach to determine 
whether an account is “significant or not” based on a series of risk factors related to the 
likelihood of financial statement error and magnitude of the account.  One of the major cost 
reductions was the change allowing external auditors to rely more on the internal audit function 
                                                 
5  Surveys by Financial Executives International and CRA International were completed in 2005 a follow up in 
2006.  Each survey showed costs to be higher than expected and audit fees consisted of approximately 35% of the 
total.      
6 Passed by the SEC on July 25, 2007. 
7 An integrated audit involves the audits of internal control with the audit of the client's financial statements; so that 
evidence gathered and tests conducted in the context of either audit contribute to completion of both audits (PCAOB 
Release 2005-009).  
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by removing AS2’s principal evidence requirement.  How this change affects the external 
auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function has not been previously examined and 
is an area of increased importance as a result of these regulatory changes.  
AS5 allows the auditors to apply professional judgment in determining the extent to 
which they will use the internal audit function.  PCAOB’s report on the first-year 
implementation of AS5 showed the inspectors observed instances “where the extent of the 
auditor’s use of the internal audit function to reduce the auditor’s own work was greater than was 
appropriate under AS5 considering the level of risk associated with the control being tested” 
(PCAOB Release 2009-006, p.6).  In addition the inspectors observed numerous instances 
“where the extent of the auditors’ retesting of the internal audit function was seemingly unrelated 
to the risk involved (PCAOB Release 2009-006, p. 6).  The risk associated with an account or 
test affects the auditors’ reliance decisions.  As the risk associated with a control or test 
increases, the need for the auditor to perform his or her own work on the control or account 
increases.   
1.2.2  Inspection Focus 
In conjunction with the change in AS5 to make the requirements of an integrated audit 
more efficient, the PCAOB announced that its inspection process would focus not only on the 
effectiveness of a registered firm’s audits, but that it would also check to insure that the firm had 
implemented AS5 appropriately (PCAOB Release No. 104-2006-105). This included making 
sure that firms are also conducted their audits efficiently.  
SOX Section 104 requires that registered public accounting firms be inspected by the 
PCAOB.  The PCAOB’s selection of audits for inspection does not appear to be random but 
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rather based on the riskiness of the audited entity.8   A review of inspection reports shows that 
the PCAOB inspection teams have been critical of many of the audits inspected.9  While the 
focus of prior inspections has been on the effectiveness of the audit, the PCAOB recently stated 
that its future inspections will look at the efficiency of the audit.10 In light of changes required by 
AS5 discussed above, inspectors will also focus on how efficiently the firms performed the audit.  
More specifically, inspectors will evaluate the degree of integration between the audit of ICFR 
and the audit of financial statements, including the use of a top-down approach, proper 
assessment of and response to identified risks, and using the internal audit function.  In the first-
year inspection reports under AS5, inspectors noted instances where auditor’s relied on the 
internal audit function greater than was appropriate considering the level of risk associated with 
the control being tested, but they also noted numerous instances where auditors’ retested the 
internal audit function when it was unrelated to the risk involved (PCAOB Release 2009-006, p. 
6). 
I examine two differing PCAOB inspection focuses:  One where the focus is on 
effectiveness only and one where the focus is a more balanced approach between effectiveness 
and efficiency.  I expect the auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function will 
increase when the PCAOB’s inspection focus is on effectiveness and efficiency.  In contrast, I 
expect the auditors’ reliance decision will decrease or remain the same when the PCAOB’s focus 
is on effectiveness. 
                                                 
8 PCAOB 2005 Annual Report states “the PCAOB chose those audits, and the particular aspects reviewed, on the 
basis of its assessment of the risk of material misstatement or significant auditing deficiencies, as well as firm-
specific risks” (p. 8).   
9 PCAOB Release No. 2005-023, 2007-004. 
10 PCAOB Release No. 104-2006-105, 2007-004. 
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1.2.3 The Effect of Engagement Risk 
Auditors are facing increased litigation pressure as a result of the corporate failures (e.g., 
Enron and WorldCom) that led to the passage of SOX.11  When faced with increased engagement 
(or litigation) risk,12 auditors adjust the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures.  Prior 
research on engagement risk shows that, in general, auditors become more conservative when 
faced with high engagement risk.  For example, auditors have been found to allow more 
aggressive reporting by clients when engagement risk is low than when engagement risk is high 
(Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996). Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) also show that engagement 
risk affects a number of auditor decisions, including evidence gathering choices.   
I chose to examine the auditors’ reliance decision under differing engagement risk levels 
because auditors face a new regulatory environment as a result of the changes brought on by AS5 
and the PCAOB inspection process.  The emphasis by the PCAOB on increased efficiencies in 
the integrated audit to reduce costs and the increase in engagement risk will likely create a 
natural conflict in the auditors’ decision process for evidence gathering.  For example, when 
engagement risk is low and the inspection process emphasizes increased efficiency, auditors are 
likely to rely more on the internal audit function. However, when engagement risk is high and 
there is an increased emphasis on efficiency in the inspection process, auditors may not rely on 
the internal audit function sufficiently to satisfy PCAOB inspectors.  
This study examines auditor reliance decisions under different focuses of the PCAOB 
inspection process, engagement risk levels, and riskiness levels of audit tests or procedures.  
How each of these factors interacts with one another and affect auditors’ decisions to use the 
internal audit function (i.e. internal auditors) is the focus of this research.   
                                                 
11 “Auditor liability:  to cap or not to cap?” The Accountant January 31, 2007. 
12 Engagement risk is defined as the risk that the audit firm is exposed to loss or injury from events arising in 
connection with the audited financial statements (SAS 47).  
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1.3 Overview of Methodology  
 I conduct an experiment that uses experienced auditors (senior associates to partners). 
The experiment presented participants with background information about SOX and the PCAOB, 
and case information for a hypothetical company.  I used a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-factorial design 
with Engagement Risk and Focus of the Inspection as between-subjects factors and Riskiness of 
the Test and the Type of Test as repeated measures factors. I manipulated engagement risk at two 
levels: high and low. I also manipulated the focus of the PCAOB at two levels (an effectiveness 
level and a balanced level).  The first level serves as a control condition while the second level 
serves as the test condition. For the repeated measures factors, the participants make eight 
reliance decisions on four tests of controls and four substantive procedures that vary based on 
their riskiness (high and low).  Each test is measured on an 11 point scale from no reliance to 
moderate reliance to extensive reliance.  Four dependent variables for each participant are 
constructed by using the average responses for the two types of tests (tests of controls and 
substantive procedures) and the two levels of riskiness for the tests.   
1.4   Overview and Discussion of Findings 
 My findings suggest that auditor reliance decisions are impacted by differing levels of 
engagement risk, the focus of PCAOB inspection process, and the riskiness of audit tests. In 
addition, the auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function varies by the type of audit test.  In 
general, as engagement risk increased, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function decreased.  
Also, as the riskiness of the test decreased, the auditor placed more reliance on the internal audit 
function.  However, these factors interacted with one another.  Specifically, when auditors 
planned low riskiness tests, the change in their reliance decisions was based on the level of 
engagement risk with the balanced focus of inspection always resulting in more reliance than the 
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effectiveness focus of inspection. When auditors planned high riskiness tests, the auditors’ 
reliance decisions did not differ for the effectiveness focus of the inspection process across both 
levels of engagement risk, whereas in the balanced focus of inspection their reliance decisions 
were higher when engagement risk was low relative to when engagement risk was high.   
I also found that the auditors’ reliance decisions varied by tests of controls and 
substantive procedures.  First, auditors relied more on the internal audit function to conduct tests 
of controls than substantive procedures. Second, when planning test of controls, auditors’ rely 
more on the internal audit function when the focus of the PCAOB inspection focus is balanced, 
the riskiness of the test is low, and the engagement risk is low.  Third, the auditors’ reliance 
decisions when planning substantive procedures, shows the following. First, when considering 
reliance on the internal audit function to perform substantive procedures, auditors’ reliance 
decisions depend on the level of engagement risk and not the focus of the inspection. Second, 
when riskiness of the substantive test is low, the auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function 
was not impacted by the focus of the PCAOB inspection process. Third, when the riskiness of 
the substantive test was high, the auditors relied more on the internal audit function when the 
focus of the PCAOB’s inspection process was balanced. 
 1.5 Contribution of Research 
The proposed research has important implications for auditors, regulators, academics and 
other interested stakeholders.  First, there are no research studies that I am aware of that examine 
how the PCAOB’s inspection process influences auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit 
function.  This is important given the recent changes imposed by the PCAOB.  Thus, this study 
extends the audit literature by examining how the inspection process by the PCAOB affects 
auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal auditor function (Gramling 1999, Felix et al. 2001, 
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Felix et al. 2005).  Second, AS5 allows the external auditor to rely more on the internal audit 
function when conducting an audit of ICFR.  My findings suggest that auditors’ reliance 
decisions may be compromised and result in unintended consequences from this regulatory 
change.  For example, when the riskiness of the test is high, instead of conducting the work 
themselves, the auditor may rely on the internal audit function and not collect the appropriate 
corroborating evidence.  Third, auditors face increased pressure to maintain a high level of 
effectiveness while increasing the efficiency of their audits. To my knowledge, there is little 
empirical research in auditing related to the tradeoff between effectiveness and efficiency.  This 
study examines the effectiveness/efficiency tradeoff by having auditors make reliance decisions 
where there is an increased emphasis on efficiency holding effectiveness constant.  Therefore, 
the impact of effectiveness/efficiency pressures is directly examined.  When auditors’ are under 
pressures to increase efficiency and hold effectiveness constant, they will rely more on the 
internal audit function than if they are under pressure only for effectiveness.  Lastly, prior 
research has examined how engagement risk influences auditors’ decision-making behavior (e.g., 
Knapp 1985; Walo 1995; Hackenbrack & Nelson 1996; Johnstone 2000). This study extends this 
risk-based auditing research by examining engagement risk under the new regulatory pressures 
of the PCAOB inspection process.  The impact of engagement risk on auditors’ reliance 
decisions depends on the focus of the PCAOB inspection process and the riskiness of the tests.  
When the focus of the PCAOB inspection is on a more balanced approach, auditors’ reliance 
decisions are greater the lower the engagement risk, but when the focus of the PCAOB 
inspection is on an effectiveness approach and the riskiness of the test is high, auditors’ reliance 
decisions do not differ between the level of engagement risk.    
 10 
 
1.6 Organization of Dissertation 
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides 
background information and a review of relevant literature.  Chapter 3 develops applicable 
theories and hypotheses.  Chapter 4 describes the experiment and related methodology.  Chapter 
5 presents a discussion of results.  Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation with a summary of 
findings, and a discussion of the contributions, limitations, and avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 This chapter provides background information and reviews relevant literature.   Section 
2.1 discusses SOX and PCAOB regulations.  Section 2.2 reviews prior research on external 
auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function.  Section 2.3 examines engagement risk while 
Section 2.4 examines audit efficiency.  Lastly, Section 2.5 closes with a brief summary. 
2.1 SOX and PCAOB Regulation  
 
The internal audit function has had an increasing role in the external audit over the last 
decade due to changes in regulation.  First, in 2002, SOX was passed with requirements that (1) 
companies establish and maintain an adequate system of internal controls sufficient to ensure 
reliable financial reporting and (2) management assess the effectiveness of internal control.  In 
addition, the external auditor is also required to report on the effectiveness of the entity’s internal 
control. The internal audit function plays a major role in such activities.  Second, since 
November 2003, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) requires that listed companies must 
maintain an internal audit function to provide management and the audit committee with ongoing 
assessments of the company’s risk management processes and system of internal control (NYSE 
Section 303A).  
2.1.1  PCAOB  Inspection Process 
The PCAOB is responsible for oversight of the integrated financial statement audits of 
publicly-traded corporations. Part of this oversight includes issuing auditing standards that 
provide guidance over auditor ethics and independence; supervision; hiring and development of 
audit personnel; and client acceptance and continuation. The PCAOB is also responsible for 
 12 
 
inspecting auditing firms to ensure their compliance with SOX regulations and professional 
auditing standards. The PCAOB can impose sanctions on accounting firms, including civil 
penalties and suspensions from auditing public companies. The PCAOB may refer these matters 
to the SEC and the Department of Justice for further legal action if it believes such action is 
needed. 
The Board conducts a continuing program of inspections to assess the degree of 
compliance of each registered public accounting firm and associated persons of that firm with 
SOX, the rules of the Board, the rules of the Commission, and professional standards. PCAOB 
inspections are designed to identify and address weaknesses and deficiencies related to how a 
firm conducts audits. To achieve that goal, Board inspections include reviews of certain aspects 
of selected audits performed by a firm and reviews of other matters related to a firm's quality 
control system.  The Board sets its own rules for the inspection process.    
2.1.2  The Potential Impact of AS5 on the Integrated Audit  
The PCAOB issued AS2 in 2004 to provide guidance in conducting the integrated audit 
for public companies.  This standard was criticized for being too costly as a result of excessive 
auditing by requiring unnecessary procedures and limiting the use of the internal audit function 
through the principal evidence requirement.13  In 2007, the PCAOB issued AS5 with the 
intention of providing audit guidance to decrease audit costs by encouraging auditors to focus on 
the matters that are most important to internal controls.14  AS5 incorporates a top-down approach 
that begins with an assessment of company-level controls and financial statement elements and 
then links them to significant accounts, relevant assertions, and to significant processes.15  AS5 
                                                 
13 Refer to Chapter 1 
14 See SEC meeting, July 25, 2007. 
15  PCAOB Release No. 2007-005A, June 12, 2007.  AS5 codifies the guidance introduced on a policy statement 
regarding implementation of AS2 (PCAOB Release No. 2005-009, May 16, 2005). 
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emphasizes the importance of risk assessment and encourages external auditors to place more 
reliance on the internal audit function (e.g., internal auditors), especially in areas of lower risk.  
AS5 also allows multi-location site visits to be determined based on risk rather than coverage 
and allows audit risk assessments to be influenced by the results obtained in prior audits.  Such 
guidance requires that the risk assessments should drive the external auditors’ focus towards 
higher risk areas.   
With respect to the integrated audit and the internal audit function, AS5 provides the 
following guidance:  The auditor should evaluate the extent to which he or she will use the 
internal audit function to reduce the work the auditor might otherwise perform himself or herself 
(paragraph 16). Thus, the auditor may use work performed by, or receive direct assistance from, 
internal auditors, company personnel (in addition to internal auditors), and third parties working 
under the direction of management or the audit committee that provide evidence about the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. In an integrated audit, the auditor also 
may use this work to provide evidence supporting the auditor's assessment of control risk for 
purposes of the audit of the financial statements. The extent to which the auditor may use the 
internal audit function in an audit of internal control also depends on the risk associated with the 
control being tested. As the risk associated with a control increases, the need for the auditor to 
perform his or her own work on the control increases.  
2.1.3  Current Research on the PCAOB Inspection Process  
Currently, there has been little research on the PCAOB inspection process.  Lennox and 
Pittman (2009) examined audit firm supervision since the PCAOB began inspections.  They find 
that audit clients do not perceive the PCAOB’s inspection reports as valuable information for 
signaling audit quality and examining both peer reviews and inspection reports under the new 
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regulatory regime, there appears to be less transparency about audit firm quality.  Several studies 
deal with the deficiencies noted in the inspection reports (Hermanson et al. 2007; Gramling et al. 
2008). 
2.2 Prior Research on External Auditors’ Reliance on the Internal Audit Function  
External auditors have always had the option of relying on the internal audit function in 
conducting a financial statement audit.  SAS No. 65 (AU 322) was the first auditing standard to 
formalize the process to be followed by the external auditor when using internal auditors for 
assistance.16  SAS No. 65 (AICPA, April 1991) outlines two principal ways in which internal 
auditors’ work may impact the external audit process for a financial statement audit.  First, the 
external auditor can evaluate the competence, objectivity and work performed of the internal 
audit function and if it is deemed proficient or acceptable, the auditor can rely on the internal 
audit work.  Second, the internal audit function can provide direct assistance to the auditor on a 
financial statement audit.     
2.2.1 Research on internal audit function 
Research on the reliance of the internal audit function began with empirical studies that 
developed a list of factors, or indicators, for evaluating the competency (Gibbs and Schroeder, 
1979), performance, and objectivity (Clark et al. 1980; Clark et al. 1981) of internal auditors.   
Brown (1983) was the first study to focus on factors that might be considered important by 
external auditors in evaluating the reliability of an internal audit function, and the degree to 
which consistent use is made of those factors across auditors.   Brown used a questionnaire that 
included a brief description of a manufacturing concern and then provided 48 different scenarios 
of internal audit function characteristics which encompassed competence, objectivity, and 
                                                 
16 SAS No. 9 “The Effect of an Internal Audit Function on the Scope of the Independent Audit (AICPA 1975) 
provided the three main areas: objectivity, quality and competency, but did not provide any benchmarks or 
measurement criteria.  The reliance decision was left up to auditor judgment. 
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performance dimensions.  The participants made degree of reliability judgments on each 
scenario. Brown found that independence and previous years’ audit work were the primary 
factors used by the auditors, regardless of their firm affiliation or years of audit experience. 
Schneider (1984) ran three experiments to identify descriptive models of how external 
auditors evaluate the three factors (competence, objectivity, and work performed by the internal 
audit function) identified in SAS No. 65.  Schneider (1985b) examined the degree of agreement 
among auditors in evaluating the internal audit function and he found a high degree of consensus.  
Schneider (1985a) examined both the extent to which auditors would rely on the internal audit 
function, and the relationship between the reliance decision and their evaluation of internal audit 
strength.  The three factors were used to construct various case profiles of an internal audit 
function.  The auditors ranked these profiles in terms of strength and then indicated the amount 
of external audit hours they would assign for each profile.  The results showed that auditors 
generally relied on internal auditing to reduce their external audit work and the relative 
importance weights of the three factors were approximately the same for the reliance decisions 
and for the evaluation judgments.    
Margheim (1986) examined whether external auditors adjusted the nature and extent of 
audit procedures due to reliance on internal auditors and, if so, whether this reliance related to 
the competence, objectivity, and work performed by the internal auditors.  She found that 
auditors adjusted their planned audit hours when a high level of competence/work performance 
existed but they did not adjust their hours to different degrees of internal auditor objectivity.   
Additional studies examined external auditor reliance on the internal audit function along 
the three factors prescribed by professional auditing standards (Brown and Karan 1986; Edge 
and Farley 1991; Felix et al. 2001; Maletta 1993; Maletta and Kida 1993; and Messier and 
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Schneider 1988). While these studies find differences in ranking the importance of the three 
factors, they do provide evidence that each factor used to evaluate the internal audit function 
influenced the extent to which external auditors rely on the work performed by internal auditors.   
2.2.2 Other factors affecting reliance 
A number of research studies examined other factors that affected the external auditor’s 
reliance decision.  Whittington and Margheim (1993) examined materiality and inherent risk and 
varied each on two levels in an experimental setting.  The results showed that at the low 
materiality level the audit managers assigned more tests of control work to the internal auditors, 
but the substantive work appeared to depend on the nature of the individual assertion’s evidence.  
Inherent risk factors were not found to be significant.  DeZoort et al. (2001) examined the effects 
of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two different routine tasks:  an objective 
test of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task.  They found auditors’ reliance 
decisions were only impacted when there was incentive compensation under a subjective task, 
and consulting roles had no effect under either task.   Gramling (1999) conducted an experiment 
that examined whether audit managers’ planning decisions are influenced by client fee pressure 
and by the preferences of the audit partner.  She found that audit managers under high fee 
pressure relied more on the internal audit’s work than under less fee pressure, and partner 
preferences influenced the audit managers’ reliance decisions, but the results did not show an 
interaction between fee pressure and partner preferences.   Felix et al. (2001) found that the 
internal audit contribution to the external audit is influenced by internal audit quality and 
conditional on the level of inherent risk, the availability of internal audit and the extent of 
coordination between internal and external auditors.  Finally, Felix et al. (2005) examined how 
external audit evidence gathering choices are influenced by nonaudit fees and client pressures.  
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They found that when significant nonaudit services are provided, client pressure significantly 
increases the extent of internal audit reliance.  Each of these studies showed that a number of 
various factors (i.e. level of materiality, incentive compensation, fee pressure, and nonaudit 
services) can influence the external auditors’ evaluation of the internal audit function.   
2.2.3 Outsourcing 
A number of recent research studies examined the effects of sourcing arrangements on 
the external auditors’ reliance decision.  The internal audit function has traditionally been seen as 
internal to the business, but a number of companies outsourced some or all of their internal audit 
activities (Cheney 1995; Aldihizer and Cashell 1996; Powell 1997).  Prior research has examined 
the extent of internal audit outsourcing (e.g., Pelfrey and Peacock 1995; Petravick 1997) and 
other studies have examined the effects of performance of the dual role of internal and external 
audits on external auditor judgments (e.g., Lowe et al. 1999; Swanger and Chewning 2001; 
James 2003).   Other studies examined whether the in-house auditors or outsourcing the internal 
audit function impacts the auditors reliance decisions.  For example, Ahlawat and Lowe (2004) 
examined the impact of outsourcing on internal auditor judgments.  Participants in their study 
were from corporations (in-house) and Big 4 accounting firms (outsourced).  Each participant 
completed a case study and the results found that the source of the internal audit provider did not 
impact the external auditors’ judgment decisions.  Glover et al. (2008) used external auditors to 
complete an experimental case in which they manipulated the internal audit sourcing, and they 
found no difference when both in-house and outsourced were considered objective.   
2.3 Engagement Risk 
Engagement risk refers to the risk that the audit firm is exposed to loss or injury from 
litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with the audited financial 
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statements (Johnstone 2000; Bell et al. 2000). Prior audit research demonstrates that engagement 
risk influences auditors’ decision-making behavior (e.g., Knapp 1985; Walo 1995, Hackenbrack 
and Nelson 1996; Johnstone 2000) and is an aspect of the overall audit environment (Bell et al. 
2000; POB 2000).  More specifically, research has shown that when auditors were faced with 
higher engagement risk, they responded by requiring more conservative reporting and justifying 
their choices with conservative interpretation of accounting standards (Hackenbrack and Nelson 
1996).   
Under AS5, the auditor must consider the internal audit reliance decision as part of the 
integrated audit.  As the risk of a material misstatement increases or the degree of subjectivity 
increases, the need for the auditor to perform his or her own tests of the assertions increases.17 
Therefore, as engagement risk increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function is likely 
to decrease.  However, there are conflicting results in prior research that show that in high risk 
situations other factors may affect the reliance decisions and not only engagement risk.   
Research has found that auditors increased their audit hours when faced with higher engagement 
risk (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Clarkson and Simunic 1994) while Maletta and Kida (1993) 
found that in high risk situations the external auditors’ reliance decisions depends on the design 
of the accounting control policies and procedures and not on the engagement risk.18   
2.4 Audit Efficiency 
Auditors are always facing a tradeoff between effectiveness and efficiency concerns on 
an audit.  Clark (1921) links efficiency and effectiveness by making the argument that a system 
                                                 
17  In making judgments about the extent of the internal auditors’ work on the auditors’ procedures, the auditors 
consider the materiality of financial statement amounts, the risk of material misstatement, and the degree of 
subjectivity involved in the evaluation of evidence (PCAOB AU Section 322).  
18 Other research on litigation risk includes client risk factors, audit effort, and audit fees (Pratt and Stice, 1994; 
O’Keefe et al., 1994; Johnstone and Bedard, 2003; Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; Simunic and Stein, 1996).    
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is “inefficient when it is cheap but ineffective.”  There are few theoretical models and relatively 
little empirical research on audit efficiency.  Auditing practitioners and researchers tend to define 
efficiency as accomplishing the audit task in less time, thereby increasing profitability or 
reducing overall audit cost (e.g. Hollingshead, 1996; Davis and Solomon, 1989; Libby, 1995). 
Recently, Knechel et al. (2009) found that audits are more efficient for clients that are larger, 
have a December year-end, and are highly automated, but that audits are less efficient when the 
auditor relies on internal control, tax services are provided, and the client has subsidiaries.  This 
study developed a model on audit production but relied on data from a 1991 survey. Thus, the 
results that relying on internal controls decrease efficiency may not hold in the post-Sox 
environment that requires an integrated audit.  The PCAOB defines efficiency as the auditor 
achieving the objectives described in the Board’s standards with the least expenditure of effort 
and resources (PCAOB Release No. 2005-023).    
2.5  Summary of Chapter 2 
 Overall, there is little research on the PCAOB inspection process and how it may affect 
the external auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function.  Prior research on external 
auditors’ reliance decisions has shown that the reliance depends on a number of different factors.  
Several studies show that the internal auditors’ competency, performance, and objectivity are 
what the external auditor examines when relying on the internal audit function. Other factors that 
affect the external auditors’ internal audit reliance decisions include materiality, incentive 
compensation, client fee pressure, and non-audit services.  Engagement risk generally has the 
effect of reducing the external auditors’ reliance decisions, but there is a natural conflict when 
auditors are facing a need for audit efficiency.  This line of research leads the current study into 
the development of the hypotheses examined. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This chapter describes relevant theory and develops the formal hypotheses to be tested.  
Section 3.1 through Section 3.5 describes the theory leading to each hypothesis.  Lastly, Section 
3.6 contains a brief summary. 
3.1 Motivated Reasoning Theory 
People rely on cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their desired 
conclusions; however, motivation plays a role in determining which of these will be used in a 
given situation.  I define motivation as having a wish, desire, or preference that concerns the 
outcome of a given reasoning task (Kunda 1990).  It is the process of reasoning such as forming 
impressions, determining one’s beliefs and attitudes, evaluating evidence, and making decisions.  
This type of motivated reasoning falls into two major categories: (1) reasoning driven by 
accuracy goals or (2) reasoning driven by directional goals (Kruglanski 1980; Kruglanski & 
Ajzen 1983; Kruglanski & Klar 1987; see also Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly 1989; Pyszczynski 
& Greenberg 1987; Lodge & Taber 2000).  Both types of goals affect reasoning by influencing 
the choice of beliefs and strategies applied to a given problem. Accuracy goals lead to the use of 
those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas directional goals lead 
to the use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion.  This study 
examines reasoning under directional goals.  
 Kunda (1990) proposed that people motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt 
to be rational and construct a justification for their desired conclusion that would persuade a 
dispassionate observer.  The biasing role of goals is thus constrained by one’s ability to construct 
a justification for the desired conclusion.  There is the assumption that directional goals may 
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influence which beliefs and rules are accessed and applied on a given occasion.  Thus, this 
assumption seems reasonable because there is considerable evidence that individuals access 
different beliefs and rules on different occasions. Individuals endorse different attitudes 
(Salancik & Conway 1975; Snyder 1982), express different self-concepts (Fazio, Effrein, & 
Falender 1981), make different social judgments (Higgins & King 1981), and use different 
statistical rules (Kunda & Nisbett 1986; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda 1983).  
 Prior research in accounting suggests that auditors have directional goals.  For example, 
Farmer et al. (1987) conducted an experiment using auditors with varying levels of experience to 
choose whether to agree with a client’s decision to use an accounting approach for which there 
was no clear precedent.  The study found that the threat of a loss of the client led to more 
aggressive reporting, but the threat of a lawsuit discouraged aggressive reporting.  Lord (1992) 
and Roberts and Cargile (1994) found similar results.   Finally, Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) 
found that auditors tend to make the reporting decisions favored by the incentives they face.  
Specifically, auditors preferred aggressive reporting when engagement risk was moderate or low, 
but preferred conservative reporting when engagement risk was high.    
 The effect of directional goals on auditors’ evidence evaluation affects auditors’ 
decisions throughout the audit process.  In the planning phase, the auditor searches for, and 
evaluates, information and terminates this search when sufficient information has been gathered 
to generate a final assessment.  The auditors’ final assessment is then used to make a reporting 
decision.  Prior research provides evidence that directional goals influence an individuals’ initial 
assessment of a neutral attribute situation (Russo et al. 1996) or when less balanced information 
is provided (Russo et al. 1998).  Blay (2005) examined independence threats from litigation risk 
using a going concern situation. Auditors with high threats to their independence evaluated their 
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clients as more likely to survive, both initially and as they proceeded to evaluate new 
information.  Auditors facing high litigation risk evaluated clients as less likely to survive at the 
completion of the evidence evaluation process.  Kadous et al. (2003) examined the gap between 
an aggressive method that a client prefers and the most appropriate method.  They found that 
when there is ambiguity in the method choice, auditors used directional goals to make their 
choice decisions.   
3.2  Engagement Risk 
Engagement risk influences auditor behavior and is one of the leading risks facing the 
audit profession (Lowe et al. 2002).  Auditors must consider engagement risk throughout the 
audit process (i.e. from client acceptance/retention to issuance of the audit reports on an 
integrated audit), and the effect of engagement risk on evidence gathering choices is potentially 
influenced by auditor incentives.  For example, auditors have been found to allow more 
aggressive reporting by clients when engagement risk is low (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996).   
As discussed in Chapter 2, prior audit research demonstrates that engagement risk 
influences auditors’ decision-making behavior (e.g., Knapp 1985; Walo 1995, Hackenbrack and 
Nelson 1996; Johnstone 2000) and is an aspect of the overall audit environment (Bell et al. 2000; 
POB 2000).  More specifically, research has shown that when auditors are faced with higher 
engagement risk, they respond by requiring conservative reporting and justify their choices with 
conservative interpretation of accounting standards (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996).   
One possible reason for this behavior is that auditors, many times, are blamed when 
investors and creditors suffer financial losses (Stice 1991).  When faced with relatively high 
levels of engagement risk, auditors typically increase audit fees, planned audit hours, and 
evidence requirements (Simunic 1980; Pratt and Stice 1994; Houston et al 1999), particularly in 
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areas involving a great deal of subjective judgment such as accounting estimates and accruals 
(Lys and Watts 1994).  Engagement risk focuses auditors’ attention on making accurate 
decisions (Palmrose 1988; Stice 1991) and auditors are less willing to accept errors in financial 
statements as engagement risk increases (Chang and Hwang 2003; Farmer et al. 1987).  Given 
the litigious environment in which the audit profession operates, auditors are acutely aware that 
they must be prepared to defend their decisions to jurors should the need arise (Lowe and 
Reckers 2000).  Staw (1980) refers to this phenomenon as prospective rationality, where 
decisions are made with foresight knowledge that decisions may need to be defended in the 
future.  Auditors will attempt to identify the most defensible course of action (Tetlock 1985; 
Messier and Quilliam 1992).   
Because the effect of engagement risk can be driven by varying incentives, Gibbins 
(1984) proposed that when auditors are faced with uncertainty or risk, they tend to focus on the 
potential negative consequences of each decision option because the penalties for error are more 
significant than the rewards for positive results.  Emby and Gibbins (1988) suggest that auditors 
will also require more justification in situations with an element of risk due to an increased 
concern over negative consequences.  When engagement risk is high, auditors are more likely to 
conduct audit work themselves rather than rely on the internal audit’s work.  Based on the 
previous arguments, I propose the first hypothesis:      
H1: As engagement risk increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will 
decrease. 
 
3.3   Riskiness of the Audit Tests 
 As discussed previously, specifically with engagement risk, the risk associated with an 
audit test should also affect the auditors’ reliance decisions.  Under AS5, the auditor is required 
to use a risk-based approach based on a series of risk factors.  As the riskiness of the test 
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increases, the likelihood that the external auditor will perform the test increases.  This leads to 
the following hypothesis:   
H2: As the riskiness of the test increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit 
function will decrease. 
 
3.4  The Interaction of Engagement Risk, Focus of the Inspection Process, and Riskiness 
 of the Test  
 
Audit firms face pressures from numerous sources (i.e. clients, regulators, markets) to 
increase both the effectiveness and efficiency of their audits (Lowe et al. 2002).   AS5 states that 
the auditor is solely responsible for obtaining sufficient competent evidence to support his or her 
opinions on an integrated audit.  However, the PCAOB has cautioned auditors that repeating 
work performed by competent professionals within the entity (i.e. internal auditors) would 
unnecessarily increase audit costs without producing a corresponding increase in audit quality.  
Therefore, auditors are responsible for minimizing redundancy by relying on the internal audit 
function where appropriate while still ensuring high audit quality.  In such situations, auditors 
should attempt to hold effectiveness constant while increasing efficiency.  The PCAOB, through 
its inspection process, found that auditors did not fully utilize the internal audit function.  For 
example, the inspectors noted that many auditors duplicated internal auditors work in lower-risk 
areas (PCAOB Release 2007-004). 
Based on the 2005 inspections, the PCAOB found that auditors lacked efficiency in using 
the internal audit function to the extent permitted by AS2 (PCAOB Release 104-2006-105).   In 
response, the PCAOB announced that it would focus its 2006 inspections on whether auditors 
achieved cost-saving efficiencies in audits and its inspectors would check to see whether auditors 
took full advantage of the opportunities to use the internal audit function, such as the company’s 
internal audit staff (SEC Release 2006-75).  Conclusions from the 2006 inspection reports 
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revealed that progress was made in improving the efficiency of audits of ICFR, but that auditors 
could have increased their use of the internal audit function even more (PCAOB Release 2007-
004).   
As discussed previously, AS5 allows the auditor to apply professional judgment in 
determining the extent to which they will use the internal audit function.  The PCAOB’s report 
on the first-year implementation of AS5 showed that the inspectors observed instances “where 
the extent of the auditor’s use of the internal audit function to reduce the auditor’s own work was 
greater than was appropriate under AS5 considering the level of risk associated with the control 
being tested” (PCAOB Release 2009-006, p.6).  In addition the inspectors observed numerous 
instances “where the extent of the auditors’ retesting of the internal audit function was seemingly 
unrelated to the risk involved (PCAOB Release 2009-006 p. 6). Thus, the PCAOB observed 
auditors over-and under-relying on the internal audit function. 
Prior research suggests that audit quality is a function of the amount and extent of audit 
procedures performed (Dopuch and Simunic 1982).    Felix et al. (2001) demonstrated that 
reliance on the internal audit function decreased the annual external audit fee, which is one of the 
factors motivating the PCAOB to increase the reliance on the internal audit function.  
Psychology research suggests that when individuals know the views of their audience prior to 
forming an opinion, they adopt the position that they expect will gain favor with the person to 
whom they are accountable (see Lerner and Tetlock 1999 and Messier and Quilliam 1992 for 
reviews).  When the PCAOB places an emphasis on increased efficiency, auditors can reduce 
audit hours by relying more on the internal audit function.   If the PCAOB (by way of AS5, 
inspections, and other pronouncements) puts pressure on auditors to increase efficiency, this is 
likely to affect the auditors’ decision to rely on the internal audit function. 
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 Auditors’ incentives can be influenced by engagement risk and the riskiness of the tests.  
While I have predicted a main effect for engagement risk and the riskiness of the tests, I expect 
that engagement risk, the riskiness of the test, and the focus of the PCAOB inspection process 
will interact in a predicted manner and result in a three-way interaction.  More specifically, I 
expect that the interaction between engagement risk and focus of the inspection will differ 
depending on the level of the riskiness of the test.    
Under motivated reasoning theory, decision makers with directionally motivated goals 
evaluate information consistent with a desired conclusion, so long as the conclusion is justifiable 
(Kunda 1990: Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987).  This holds particularly true when a preference 
exists prior to the decision stage (Russo et al.1996).  The PCAOB is seeking a balanced approach 
for the conduct of an integrated audit (i.e. hold effectiveness constant while increasing 
efficiency) while auditors face increased engagement risk.   Brown et al. (1999) suggest that 
when auditors know the preferences of powerful others, auditors may have difficulty 
disentangling the preferences of powerful others from their own beliefs.   
Auditors should evaluate all relevant information in the evaluation process and should not 
be influenced to adjust the evaluation process by potential pressures (e.g. Beckmann and 
Gollwitzer 1987).  For example, auditors faced with increased engagement risk are less likely to 
rely on the internal audit function while pressure from the PCAOB to lower the cost of their 
audits should lead to higher reliance on the internal audit function. These two pressures are not 
likely to be significant when the riskiness of the test is low.  However, when the riskiness of the 
test is high, auditors are faced with balancing the competing pressures of engagement risk and 
the focus of the PCAOB’s inspection process. Thus, when the riskiness of the test if high, the 
auditors’ reliance decisions will vary based on which pressure they believe to be more powerful 
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[engagement risk (risk of litigation) or the PCAOB (risk of sanctions)].  I predict when the 
riskiness of the test is low, the PCAOB pressure will prevail, but when the riskiness of the test is 
high, I expect the risk of litigation to prevail. 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H3a: When the riskiness of the test is low, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit 
function will be higher when the focus of the PCAOB inspection process includes 
both a focus of effectiveness and efficiency regardless of the level of engagement 
risk. 
 
H3b: When the riskiness of the test is high, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit 
function will be higher when the focus of the PCAOB inspection process includes 
both a focus of effectiveness and efficiency but only when engagement risk is low. 
There will be no difference between the auditors’ reliance on the internal audit 
function when the focus of the PCAOB inspection process is between effectiveness 
only or includes both effectiveness and efficiency when engagement risk is high. 
Thus, H3a predicts that when the riskiness of the test is low, the balanced condition 
(includes both the effectiveness and efficiency focus) of the PCAOB focus will dominate the 
auditors’ reliance decisions. However, in H3b, where the riskiness of the test is high, the auditors’ 
reliance decision will be higher in the balanced condition only when engagement risk is low. 
Figure 3.1 shows the predicted interaction across each level of the riskiness of the audit tests. 
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Figure 3.1:  Riskiness of the Test 
 
 
 
3.5  Type of Audit Tests: Tests of Controls versus Substantive Procedures  
Prior research has shown that auditors rely on the internal auditors’ work only to the 
extent that they can assess the competence, objectivity, and performance of the internal audit 
function (Brown 1983).  Ward’s (1979) research found that “external auditors rely upon internal 
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auditors more in connection with internal controls than for direct assistance in performing audit 
procedures.”  Ward (1979) and Ward and Robertson (1980) examined the nature of the internal 
auditors’ work used by external auditors.  They found that external auditors relied on internal 
auditors to a greater extent in connection with test of controls versus substantive testing.  
Margheim (1986) examined both compliance tests and substantive tests and found that the 
auditors’ reliance decisions were impacted similarly based on the changes within the three 
factors (competence, objectivity, and performance), and not the type of tests.  Whittington and 
Margheim (1993) found similar results except in the consideration of materiality.  They found 
that in the low materiality setting, external auditors assigned more work to the internal auditors 
in using test of controls (69%) than using substantive testing (55%).  They concluded that “even 
at a low materiality levels the participant felt that the external auditor had an obligation to 
directly perform much of the substantive work, but were very willing to let the internal auditors 
perform a large majority of the tests of controls work.”  This implies that the size of an account 
balance or transaction matters when external auditors test internal controls but not in the 
performance of substantive testing. However, Mills (1996) examined the effect of cognitive style 
on the external auditors’ reliance decisions and found no difference between test of controls and 
the substantive procedures and the other factors examined.  
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) advocates an internal control focus when it 
defines the scope of internal auditing: "The scope of internal auditing should encompass the 
examination and evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the organization's system of 
internal control and the quality of performance in carrying out assigned responsibilities" (IIA 
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1992).19  Hence; external auditors have more opportunities to rely on internal auditors’ work 
when performing tests of controls versus substantive testing.   
Prior to SOX, auditors made decisions between tests of controls and substantive 
procedures purely on cost/benefit grounds (AU Section 319.44; O’Keefe et al. 1994). Auditors 
could set control risk at high and collect only substantive evidence if it was more efficient to do 
so. With the passage of SOX, external auditors’ tests of controls have increased because they 
need more evidence on controls in order to issue a report on ICFR.  Under AS5, auditors are 
required to perform tests of controls; and risk assessment underlies this process, including the 
selection of the controls to test, and the determination of the audit evidence necessary (AS5, 
paragraph 10). Based on prior research and changes to audit regulation related to internal control, 
the external auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function should be higher for tests of controls 
versus substantive procedures. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
  H4: Auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will be higher for test of 
controls than substantive procedure. 
 
3.6   Summary of Chapter 3 
 Drawing on motivated reasoning theory, I examine the different pressures that effect 
auditors’ evidence gathering on the internal audit function.  I hypothesize that as engagement 
risk or the riskiness of the test increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will 
decrease.  I predict there will be a three-way interaction between engagement risk, the focus of 
the PCAOB’s inspection process, and the riskiness of the test.  Lastly, I predict that the type of 
test (test of controls v. substantive procedures) should impact the auditors’ reliance decision on 
                                                 
19 Current IIA standards under in section 2100-Nature of Work define “the internal audit activity must evaluate and contribute to 
the improvement of governance, risk management, and control processes using a systematic and disciplined approach.” 
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the internal audit function.  Chapter 4 describes the experimental procedure employed to test the 
hypothesized effects.   
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the experimental research method used.  Section 4.1 
describes experimental participants while section 4.2 describes the experimental design.  Section 
4.3 describes the Case Materials.  Section 4.4 describes the experimental procedures while 
Section 4.5 describes the hypotheses testing procedures.  Section 4.6 concludes with a brief 
summary. 
4.1    Participants 
My choice of participants for the study was based on detailed discussions with two 
partners from a major public accounting firm.20  The partners indicated that the final decision on 
the extent of the reliance on the internal audit function for an integrated audit rests with the audit 
partner and manager.  However, they indicated that the in-charge auditor (senior associate) 
would participate in the process leading up to the final decision on the extent of the use of the 
internal audit function (also see, Glover et al. 2008). Thus, I requested that the participating firms 
provide auditors ranging from senior associate to partner to participate in this study. 
Seventy-six external auditors participated in this experiment from three major public 
accounting firms.  Five participants were deleted because four failed one or more of the 
manipulation checks and one did not take the task seriously.21 Thus, the final sample consists of 
71 auditors (6 partners, 5 senior managers, 20 managers, and 40 senior associates). Table 4.1 
contains a summary of relevant demographic data. All participants stated that they have 
previously worked on an integrated audit.  The average auditing experience is 6.17 years overall 
with the experience by rank shown in Table 4.1. Thus, the sample represented an experienced 
                                                 
20 These two partners also assisted with the development of the case materials. 
21 See section 5.1 for a discussion of the manipulation checks. 
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group of auditors. All participants are CPAs, one participant has a CIA (certified internal auditor) 
and 2 participants have a CFE (certified fraud examiner).   In total, 55.7 % of the participants 
have a master degree.  
Table 4.1:  Participants’ Descriptive Statistics  
   
Partner 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
[Median] 
N=6 
Senior 
Manager 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
[Median] 
N=5 
 
Manager 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
[Median] 
N=20 
 
Senior 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
[Median] 
N=40 
 
Total 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
[Median] 
N=71 
Years of Auditing Experience 
 
19.83
(3.710) 
[19.50] 
10.60 
(1.342) 
[10.00] 
6.25 
(1.803) 
[6.00] 
3.53 
(1.062) 
[3.00] 
6.17 
(4.899) 
[5.00] 
Years in Current Position 5.83  
(4.119) 
[4.00] 
3.40 
(.894) 
[4.00] 
1.7 
(.801) 
[2.00] 
1.98 (.974) 
[2.00] 
2.32 
(1.811) 
[2.00] 
Percentage of Work on 
Integrated Audits 
39.17 
(36.251) 
[30] 
77 
(16.432) 
[80] 
61.5 
(23.062) 
[75] 
51.75 
(26.879) 
[50] 
55.21 
(27.024) 
[60] 
No. of Assessment of the 
reliance on the Internal Audit 
Function 
22.5 
(14.748) 
[20] 
9.2 
(7.120) 
[10] 
4.50 
(3.411) 
[3] 
2.45 
(3.967) 
[1] 
5.20 
(7.850) 
[2] 
Other Demograpic Data      
  No. of Industries represented 
  by Participants 
5 4 8 6 9 
  No. of Participants with 
  experience with integrated   
  audits  
6 5 18 39 68 
  No. of Participants that have 
  been a Reviewee for peer or 
  practice review 
6 4 13 8 31 
  No. of Participants that have 
  been a Reviewer for peer or 
  practice review 
5 3 0 1 9 
  CPA 6 5 20 40 71 
  CIA 0 0 2 0 2 
  Education Level- Masters 2 2 12 25 41 
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4.2  Experimental Design 
4.2.1 Independent Variables 
I employ a full 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-factor design with Engagement Risk (ER) and Focus 
of the PCAOB Inspection (FOCUS) as between-subjects factors and Riskiness of the Test 
(RiskT) and the Type of Test (TT) as repeated measures.  
ER is manipulated at two levels (high and low) and is varied by manipulating information 
pertaining to engagement characteristics.22  For the high risk condition, participants were told 
that although initial sales were encouraging; the company was narrowly in compliance with 
restrictive debt covenants from which waivers had been obtained in the past.  Also, management 
bonuses were tied to sales targets and the client had recently met those sales targets. Key 
financial ratios for the current year were below industry average as they were in the previous 
year. The company had been an audit client of the firm for the past two years.  The firm had 
assessed engagement risk as “High.”  For the low risk condition, participants were told that 
initial sales were encouraging and the company had no concerns about meeting its restrictive 
debt covenants. Also, management bonuses were tied to sales targets and the client had easily 
met their sales targets. Key financial ratios for the current year were above industry average as 
were as they were in the previous year.  The company had been an audit client of the firm for the 
past twelve years.  The firm had assessed engagement risk as “Low.”  
  The FOCUS factor was manipulated at two levels: an effectiveness level and a balanced 
level. The effectiveness level served as the control level. Participants were told that the firm was 
scheduled for its annual inspection by the PCAOB and because of the nature of their firm’s 
clients, the PCAOB would use an effectiveness approach when conducting their inspection of the 
                                                 
22 The high and low conditions for engagement risk were developed based on the Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) 
case. 
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firm’s integrated audits.  Thus, the PCAOB inspection team would focus on how effective the 
firm’s audits were in terms of assessing whether the significant risk areas had been properly 
evaluated, concluded upon, and documented.  The balanced level of this factor indicated that 
their firm was scheduled for its annual inspection by the PCAOB and that because of the nature 
of their firm’s clients, the PCAOB would use a balanced approach when conducting their 
inspection of the firm’s integrated audits.  Thus, the PCAOB inspection team would focus on 
how effective the firm’s audits were in terms of assessing whether the significant risk areas had 
been properly evaluated, concluded upon, and documented.  In addition, the PCAOB inspectors 
would focus on whether the audits had been conducted in an efficient manner, including how the 
internal audit function would be used in the audit of ICFR. Table 4.2 depicts the between-subject 
factors in the study. 
TABLE 4.2.  Experimental Design for Between-Subjects Factors 
 Focus of the PCAOB Inspection Process 
Engagement Risk Effectiveness Balanced 
 
Low 
 
x a 
 
 
xb 
 
High 
 
x d 
 
x c 
 
   
RiskT and TT are tested as repeated measures. RiskT was examined at two levels: high 
and low riskiness. There were also two levels of TT: tests of controls and substantive procedures. 
In developing the materials, I used four tests of controls and four substantive procedures with 
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two of each of these procedures determined to be high risk and two to be low risk.23 Table 4.3 
presents the within-subjects factors. 
TABLE 4.3  Experimental Design for the Within-Subject Factors 
 
 Riskiness of the Tests 
Type of Tests Low Risk High Risk 
Test of Controls x 1 x 2 
Substantive Procedures x 4 x 3 
   
This 2 x 2 design can be depicted in each cell of Table 4.2. 
4.2.2 Dependent Variables 
 Participants were asked to make planned reliance decisions on the internal audit function 
for the four tests of controls and four substantive procedures on an 11 point scale ranging from 
no reliance (0) to moderate reliance (5) to extensive reliance (10). I developed four dependent 
variables for each participant by using the average responses in each of the cells contained in 
Table 4.3 for the within-subject variables. For example, x 1 was determined by taking the mean 
for the two low risk tests of controls, x 2 was determined by taking the mean for the two high risk 
tests of controls, and so on. 
4.3  Case Materials 
The experimental case was developed using materials from SOX, PCAOB website, 
PCAOB inspection reports, AS5, Hackenbrack and Nelson’s case (1996), Margheim’s case 
(1986) and several studies dealing with the reliance on the internal audit function.  I started by 
                                                 
23 The two partners noted above assisted in developing the appropriate terminology for each of the independent 
variables (also see development of case materials in section 4.3).  
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providing a preliminary draft of the materials to one of the partners mentioned above for 
comments.   Several rounds of revisions and discussions were conducted with this partner.  To 
validate the instrument once a final draft was developed, I had two different audit partners from 
the same firm and one from another public accounting firm examine the instrument and its 
variables for realism and to ensure that it captured the data that I was intending to measure and 
manipulate.  Before finalization of the instrument, two of the three partners participated in a 
conference call and recommended final adjustments to the instruments.   
The materials were extensively pilot tested.  First, thirty Master of Accounting students 
paper tested the instrument for understandability and clarity.  Second, ten auditors from a number 
of sources completed the instrument.  Finally, 16 subjects from one major accounting firm 
completed the instrument to ensure that the variables were capturing what the experiment was 
attempting to examine and that the manipulations were effective.  For the second and third 
rounds, each subject provided feedback by email or discussed the instrument with me. 
The final case materials first presented the participants with the background information 
about SOX, the PCAOB inspection process, and major changes that occurred with the issuance 
of AS5 that affected the use of the internal audit function.  The description included the 
responsibilities of the PCAOB and their ability to impose sanctions. It also described the 
inspection process and it stated that the Board sets its own rules, standards, and inspection 
approach.  The background information then introduced the participants to the two approaches 
that the board could utilize in the inspection process.   The case then provided a general 
definition of both approaches in the background information and later in the case it gave case 
specific information about which approach in was being used by the Board.  At this point, each 
participant was given the following descriptions of the two approaches:  When using the 
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effectiveness approach, the PCAOB inspectors would focus on whether sufficient appropriate 
evidence had been obtained to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial 
statements under examination.  When using the balanced approach, the PCAOB inspectors 
would focus on effectiveness, but also consider the efficiency of those audits.   Lastly, in the 
background information, the materials described the guidance for auditors in regards to using the 
internal audit function. 
The case materials next provided the participants with the company overview, description 
of its revenue process, its internal audit function, and the manipulated level (effectiveness or 
balanced) of the PCAOB inspection process.   
The company overview stated that the hypothetical company was a leading developer of 
digital laser imaging technologies. The description was based on a real company that was 
selected for a PCAOB inspection in 2006.  The independent variable for engagement risk was 
introduced to the participants in the company overview and was included in the brief description 
of the hypothetical company.  It included the specific engagement risk manipulation information 
that was adapted from Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996). 
Next, the materials provided a description of the revenue process24 that was based on 
Margheim’s (1986) and Whittington & Margheim (1993) audit program case, but adapted to the 
hypothetical company.  Major factors included that accounts receivable have been and continue 
to be material, past confirmation efforts have been effective with good response rates, the 
composition of receivables is relatively unchanged from past audits, material audit adjustments 
are recorded occasionally for receivable balance misstatements, and no discrepancies were 
                                                 
24The revenue process was used because it poses a significant audit risk to auditors and is normally considered a 
high risk area. In Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit 
(SAS99), the revenue process is an area described as a significant risk area. 
 38 
 
identified in any of the three current year quarterly reviews.   This description was identical for 
all participants.       
The case then described that the internal audit department employs 25 personnel with a 
director, 4 managers, 5 senior auditors and 15 staff auditors (Mills, 1996).  Each of the personnel 
had at least a CPA or a CIA certification (Brown, 1983; Messier & Schneider, 1988), each has at 
least a bachelors degree (Gibbs & Schroeder, 1980; Messier & Schneider, 1988), the internal 
auditor function has an average of 3 years experience with a range of 1 to 20 years experience 
(Messier & Schneider, 1988), and the internal audit reports their findings directly to the chairman 
of the audit committee (Gibbs & Schroeder, 1980; Brown, 1983; Schneider, 1984; Messier & 
Schneider, 1988).  Lastly, the description stated that the audit team has found the internal audit 
function to be competent and objective.  It also states that the internal audit function has been 
relied upon in the prior years.  This description is the same for all instruments.   
Next, the case introduced the second independent variable, the PCAOB inspection 
process.  Participants were given case specific information on either the effectiveness or 
balanced approach to the PCAOB inspection process. 
After reading the background information and case materials, participants were asked to 
provide their reliance decisions on four tests of controls and four substantive procedures.  These 
tests and procedures were based on Margheim (1986) and Whittington & Margheim (1993) audit 
program case25 and half were high risk and half were low risk which allowed the auditors to 
make reliance decisions in both high and low risk areas.   
Case questions and manipulation checks followed.  Participants were asked five questions 
about the case.  Two were about the engagement risk manipulation, one was about the PCAOB’s 
                                                 
25 Three partners from two firms assessed whether the procedures were high or low risk and also modified the 
procedures for clarity and realism.  
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focus of inspection manipulation, one asked about the likelihood of that the engagement would 
be selected for a PCAOB inspection, and the last was to rate the internal audit function.   
The next section asked participants to rate the riskiness of the test of controls and audit 
procedures that they had previously evaluated for the reliance on the work of the internal audit 
function.  Riskiness was assessed in terms of the assertion(s) being tested along a continuum 
from low to high risk using an 11 point scale ranging from low riskiness (0) to moderate 
riskiness (5) to high riskiness (10).  These assessments served as a manipulation check on the 
riskiness of the audit procedures. 
Lastly, participants completed a post-experimental questionnaire.  This was used to 
account for individual and firm differences among participants.  Completion of the instrument 
took approximately 20 minutes.  The experimental instrument is contained in Appendix A.  
4.4  Experimental Procedure 
Participants received an email giving a very brief description of the task and a link to a 
website.   Once the participants accessed the website, participants were provided with a brief 
explanation of the nature of the task.  They were then provided an informed consent. Once 
consented, each participant was randomly assigned to one of eight sets of instruments (2 
different orders for the test of controls and audit procedures presented) based upon the last two 
digits of their social security number. Upon completion, responses were downloaded and 
removed from website as required by the University’s consent procedures.   
4.5 Hypotheses Testing Procedures 
I first ran the full 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-factor design. H1 predicts as engagement risk 
increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will decrease. Hence, to test H1, I 
examine the main effect for ER in the full model.  H2 predicts a main effect on the riskiness of 
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the test; thus to test H2, I examine the main effect for RiskT in the full model.  Overall, H3a and 
H3b predict a three-way interaction: ER x FOCUS x RiskT and I examine this in the full model. 
Table 4.4  2 x 2 x 2 mixed design model for H3 
RiskT ER Focus 
  Effectiveness Balanced 
Low 
Low x A x B 
High x C x D 
High 
Low x E x F 
High x G x H 
 
To examine H3a & H3b, I refer to Table 4.4.  H3a predicts when the riskiness of the test is 
low, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will be higher in the balanced condition of 
the focus of the PCAOB inspection regardless of the level of engagement risk.  Thus, I test 
whether x A + x D = x B + x C.  H3b predicts when the riskiness of the test is high, auditors’ 
reliance on the internal audit function will be higher in the balanced condition, but only when 
engagement risk is low and there will not be a difference when engagement risk is high.   I test 
whether x E + x G < x F + x H.  Lastly, H4 predicts that auditors’ reliance decisions will be higher 
for tests of controls versus substantive procedures; hence, to test H4, I examine the main effect 
for TT in the full model.  
 Additional analyses are also conducted to evaluate other significant interactions that 
occur in the full model and related to TT.  I test these interactions by computing simple effects 
tests for each interaction.  I also ran all models separately using only test of controls and only 
substantive procedures.   
 Lastly, I tested for the following covariates: (1) experience effects (seniors versus 
managers/partners), (2) firm effects across the three firms (3 levels), (3) professional certification 
(CPA versus no certification), (4) if participant had been a reviewer (reviewer versus have not 
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been a reviewer) or a reviewee (reviewee or have not been a reviewee) under the peer reviews, 
(5) educational level (undergraduate versus master’s degree), (6) involved in an integrated audit 
(involved or have not been involved in an integrated audit), and (7) experience with integrated 
audits (used the percentage of time spent on integrated audits).  None of these covariates were 
significant in any of the analyses.   
4.6  Summary of Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 describes the experimental method employed to test the hypotheses set forth in 
Chapter 3.  In the experiment, participants were presented with a hypothetical company and 
asked to make planned reliance decisions on the internal audit function.  Using a full 2 x 2 x 2 x 
2 mixed model, participants were assigned to one of four manipulations.  Chapter 5 presents 
descriptive information regarding the data collected via the experiment and describes the 
statistical techniques employed to test hypotheses 1 through 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
 Chapter 5 describes the results of testing the research hypotheses.  Data collection 
procedures are described in Chapter 4.  Section 5.1 presents the manipulation checks and Section 
5.2 presents the descriptive statistics.  Section 5.3 describes the overall full model.  Section 5.4 
through Section 5.7 presents results from hypotheses testing and Section 5.8 provides additional 
analysis.  Finally, Section 5.9 concludes Chapter 5 with a brief summary. 
5.1   Manipulation Checks 
I conducted a number of manipulation checks. First, each participant was asked to 
indicate whether SunTek’s engagement risk was high or low based on the information that they 
received. Seventy-five of the 76 participants properly responded to this question (99 percent). I 
also used a second manipulation check for engagement risk. I asked the participants to report the 
length in years of their firm’s audit relationship with SunTek, Inc.  In the high risk condition the 
firm’s tenure was two years while it was twelve years in the low risk condition. Participants were 
asked to select the length of the firm’s tenure using three ranges (1-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-15 
years).  Five participants choose the incorrect range:  four were in the low engagement risk 
condition while only one was in the high engagement risk condition. There was only one 
participant who failed both engagement risk manipulation checks. This participant was 
eliminated from the study. 
Second, each participant was asked to indicate whether the focus of the PCAOB 
inspection process included in the materials was an effectiveness approach or a balanced 
approach. Seventy-three of the 76 participants correctly responded to this manipulation check 
(96 percent).  The three participants who responded incorrectly were eliminated from the study.   
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Third, one participant answered all answers by marking the extreme left throughout the 
entire instrument including all questions and demographics, so it appears this participant did not 
take the task seriously and was eliminated. Thus, seventy-one (of 76) participants were included 
in the study. The five participants were eliminated for the following reasons: one participant 
failed both engagement risk manipulations, three participants failed the PCAOB focus 
manipulation, and one subject did not take the task seriously.26  
Finally, I tested the manipulation of the riskiness of the tests as follows.  I asked the 
participants to rate the riskiness of each of the four tests of controls and four substantive 
procedures using an 11 point scale ranging from low riskiness (0) to moderate riskiness (5) to 
high riskiness (10). Riskiness was stated in terms of the assertion(s) being tested. I calculated the 
mean for the two low risk tests of controls and the mean for the two high risk tests of controls; 
and performed the same calculation for the two levels of riskiness for the substantive procedures. 
I then compared the means within each type of test. For the tests of controls, the two high risk 
tests of controls were judged significantly more risky than the two low risk tests of controls 
(mean = 6.24 v. 4.24; t =8.46; p<0.000).   Similarly, for substantive procedures, the two high risk 
substantive procedures were judged more risky than the two low risk substantive procedures 
(mean = 7.21 v. 4.40; t = 9.59; p<0.000).  Thus, the manipulation was successful for riskiness of 
the types of tests. 
I also asked two other questions about the materials.  First, I asked the participants how 
likely that the SunTek engagement would be selected by the PCAOB for inspection.  Likelihood 
was measured along a continuum from not likely to highly likely using an 11 point scale ranging 
from not likely (0) to highly likely (10).  The average rating was 6.77 across all participants. This 
                                                 
26 The exclusion of responses of the participants failing at least one manipulation check for engagement risk 
produced similar results for all hypotheses testing. The inclusion of all responses of the participants who were 
eliminated produced similar results for all hypotheses testing. 
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is significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale (t-test = 6.67, p = .000); indicating that the 
participants believed it was likely that the SunTek engagement would be selected by the PCAOB 
for inspection.  Second, I asked the participants to rate the competence and the objectivity of 
SunTek’s internal audit function.  The rating was measured along a continuum from low to high 
using an 11 point scale ranging from low (0) to moderate (5) to high (10).   The average rating 
across all participants was 9.94. This is significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale (t-test 
= 29.69; p = .000); indicating that the participants believed the internal audit function was 
competent and objective.   
5.2   Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 contains the descriptive statistics for auditors’ reliance decisions across the two 
levels of engagement risk.  Remember that the dependent variables were calculated as the mean 
for the high and low condition by each type of test. Thirty-seven participants were in the low 
engagement risk condition whereas 34 participants were in the high engagement risk condition. 
The overall means of the auditors’ reliance measure for low engagement risk were 6.30 vs. 4.44 
for the high engagement risk condition.  When comparing the means between high and low 
engagement risk, auditors’ reliance is significantly lower for the high condition than for the low 
condition (F = 24.61; p=.000).     
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Table 5.1  Descriptive Statistics for Auditors’ Reliance Decisions by Engagement Risk 
ER TCLow TCHigh STLow STHigh Total
Low Mean 8.18 5.42 4.47 7.15 6.30
Std. 
Deviation
(1.65) (1.88) (2.59) (2.01) (2.03)
N 37 37 37 37 37
High Mean 5.84 4.32 2.89 4.78 4.44
Std. 
Deviation
(2.29) (1.87) (1.41) (1.58) (1.79)
N 34 34 34 34 34
Total Mean 7.06 4.89 3.69 6.01 5.41
Std. 
Deviation
(2.29) (1.94) (2.25) (2.16) (2.16)
N 71 71 71 71 71
Variable Definitions: 
ER = Engagement Risk 
Low = low engagement risk 
High = high engagement risk 
TCLow = average means of the two low risk tests of controls responses 
TCHigh= average means of the two high risk tests of controls responses 
STLow = average means of the two low risk substantive tests responses 
STHigh = average means of the two high risk substantive tests responses 
 
Table 5.2 contains the descriptive statistics for auditors’ reliance decisions across the two 
levels for the focus of the PCAOB inspection process.  Thirty-one participants were in the 
Effectiveness Focus condition whereas 40 participants were in the Balanced Focus condition. 
The overall means of the auditors’ reliance measure for effectiveness condition were 4.47 vs. 
6.14 for the balanced condition.  When comparing the means between effectiveness condition 
and the balanced conditions, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function is significantly 
lower for the effectiveness condition than for the balanced condition (F = 13.81; p=.000).  
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Table 5.2  Descriptive Statistics for Auditors’ Reliance Decisions by Focus of PCAOB 
Inspection 
FOCUS TCLow TCHigh STLow STHigh Total 
Effectiveness Mean 6.00 3.55 2.44 5.90 4.47
Std. 
Deviation 
(2.38) (1.40) (1.45) (2.00) (1.81)
N 31 31 31 31 31
Balanced Mean 7.88 5.94 4.66 6.10 6.14
Std. 
Deviation 
(1.88) 
 
(1.64) (2.29) (2.30) (2.03)
N 40 40 40 40 40
Total Mean 7.06 4.89 3.69 6.01 5.41
Std. 
Deviation 
(2.29) (1.94) (2.25) (2.16) (2.16)
N 71 71 71 71 71
Variable Definitions: 
FOCUS = focus of the PCAOB Inspection Process 
Effectiveness = focus is on effectiveness 
Balanced = focus is on a balance between effectiveness/efficiency 
TCLow = average means of the two low risk tests of controls responses 
TCHigh= average means of the two high risk tests of controls responses 
STLow = average means of the two low risk substantive tests responses 
STHigh = average means of the two high risk substantive tests responses 
Table 5.3 contains the descriptive statistics for the auditors’ reliance decisions by each 
type, and riskiness, of test.  The mean for tests of controls (TC) (5.98) is significantly higher than 
the mean for substantive tests (ST) (4.85) (t-test = 5.76, p = .000), indicating that the auditors 
relied more on the internal audit function when testing controls. The means of the auditors’ 
reliance measure for TChigh vs. TCLow were 4.89 vs. 7.06 (t-test = 9.05; p=.000).  The means of 
the auditors’ reliance measure for SThigh vs. STLow were 3.69 vs. 6.01 (t-test = 7.81; p=.000).  
This shows that the auditors’ reliance decisions were significantly higher for the low risk tests 
versus the high risk tests. 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Auditors’ Reliance Decisions by the Type and Riskiness 
of the Test  
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation
TC1 71 1.0 11.0 7.10 2.61
TC2 71 1.0 11.0 7.01 2.54
TCLow 71 1.0 11.0 7.06 2.29
TC3 71 1.0 11.0 4.94 2.08
TC4 71 1.0 11.0 4.85 2.51
TCHigh 71 1.0 9.0 4.89 1.94
Overall  TC 142 1.0 11.0 5.98 1.87
ST1 71 1.0 10.0 4.68 2.21
ST2 71 1.0 11.0 7.35 2.96
STLow 71 1.0 10.5 6.01 2.16
ST3 71 1.0 11.0 3.62 2.84
ST4 71 1.0 9.0 3.76 2.30
STHigh 71 1.0 9.0 3.69 2.25
Overall ST 142 1.0 10.5 4.85 1.81
Variable Definitions: 
TCLow = average means of the two low risk tests of controls responses ((TC1 + TC2) / 2) 
TCHigh= average means of the two high risk tests of controls responses ((TC3 + TC4) / 2) 
Overall TC = average means between TCLow and TCHigh 
STLow = average means of the two low risk substantive tests responses ((ST1 +ST2) / 2) 
STHigh = average means of the two high risk substantive tests responses ((ST3 + ST4) / 2) 
Overall ST = average means between STLow and STHigh  
 
5.3   Test of the Overall Model  
Prior to testing the research hypotheses, I perform a repeated measures ANOVA for the 
full model with Engagement Risk (ER) and Focus of the PCOAB Inspection (FOCUS) as 
between-subjects factors, and Riskiness of the Test (RiskT) and the Type of Test (TT) as 
repeated measures factors, and all interaction effects. The results are presented in Table 5.4.    
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Table 5.4: Test of the Full Modela  
 
 Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
Mean 
Squares 
 
F 
 
p-values* 
Intercept 7738.45 1 7738.45 1486.96 .000 
Between Subjects      
    ER 212.43 1 212.43 40.82 .000 
    FOCUS 167.80 1 167.80 32.24 .000 
    ER * FOCUS .43 1 .43 .08 .774 
    Error 348.68 67 5.20   
Within Subjects      
    RiskT 378.38 1 378.38 170.69 .000 
    ER * RiskT 24.42 1 24.42 11.01 .001 
    FOCUS * RiskT 30.29 1 30.29 13.67 .000 
    ER  *  FOCUS * RiskT 13.92 1 13.92 6.28 .008 
    Error (RiskT) 148.52 67 2.22     
    TT 83.80 1 83.80 35.32 .000 
    ER * TT 1.00 1 1.00 .42 .518 
    FOCUS * TT 16.21 1 16.21 6.83 .011 
    ER  *  FOCUS * TT 13.35 1 13.35 5.62 .021 
    Error (TT) 158.98 67 2.37   
    RiskT * TT 1.32 1 1.32 .63 .429 
    ER * RiskT * TT  .59 1 .59 .29 .595 
    FOCUS * RiskT * TT  9.52 1 9.52 4.58 .036 
    ER * FOCUS * RiskT * TT  .50 1 .50 .24 .627 
    Error (RiskT*TT) 139.32 67 2.08   
aThe dependent variable is the external auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function on an 11 point scale ranging from no 
reliance (0) to moderate reliance (5) to extensive reliance (10) for each of the relevant tests. Refer back to Section 4.2.2 
*p-values are one-tailed if hypothesized in a direction, and two-tailed otherwise. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
ER = Engagement Risk was tested at two levels: low or high 
FOCUS = Focus of the PCAOB Inspection was tested at two levels: effectiveness focus or balanced focus  
RiskT = Riskiness of the Test was tested at two levels: low or high 
TT = Type of Test was tested at two types: tests of controls or substantive procedures    
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Table 5.5 presents the least square (adjusted) means for the 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design model 
used to examine the hypotheses 1-3.   
Table 5.5 Least Square Means for the Test of Three Factors  
(Engagement Risk, Focus of the Inspection and the Riskiness of the test) 
 
RiskT ER Focus 
  Effectiveness Balanced 
Low 
Low x A 7.35* x B 7.87* 
High x C 4.64* x D 5.90* 
High 
Low x E 3.32* x F 6.06* 
High x G 2.69* x H 4.37* 
*Least square (adjusted) means for auditors’ reliance decisions across the two types of tests from the overall model. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
ER = Engagement Risk was tested at two levels: low or high 
FOCUS = Focus of the PCAOB Inspection was tested at two levels: effectiveness focus or balanced focus  
RiskT = Riskiness of the Test was tested at two levels: low or high 
TT = Type of Test was tested at two types: tests of controls or substantive procedures    
 
5.4   Hypothesis 1 – The Effect of ER 
 H1 predicts as engagement risk increases, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function 
will decrease.  As Table 5.4 shows, there is a significant main effect for ER (F = 40.82; p = 000).  
As predicted, the adjusted mean for low ER condition (6.15) is higher than the mean for the high 
ER condition (4.40). Thus H1 is supported.  Additionally, H1 suggests an ordinal relationship 
from Table 4.4 as follows:  x A > x C, x B > x D, x E > x G, and x F > x H.  As shown in Table 5.5, 
the adjusted means results are all in the predicted direction:  7.35 > 4.64, 7.87 > 5.90, 3.32 > 
2.69, and 6.06 > 4.37.    
5.5   Hypothesis 2 – The Effect of RiskT 
 H2 predicts that the lower the riskiness of the test, the more reliance the auditors will 
place on the internal audit function. Table 5.4 shows a significant main effect for RiskT (F = 
170.69; p = 0.00). As predicted, the adjusted mean for the low riskiness tests (6.44) is higher 
than the mean for the high riskiness tests (4.11). Thus, H2 is supported.  Additionally, H2 
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suggests an ordinal relationship from Table 4.4 as follows:  x A > x E, x B > x F, x C > x G, and 
x D > x H.  As seen in Table 5.5, the adjusted means results are all in the predicted direction:  
7.35 > 3.32, 7.87 > 6.06, 4.64 > 2.69, and 5.90 > 4.37.    
5.6   Hypothesis 3 – The Interaction of Engagement Risk, Focus of the Inspection Process 
  and Riskiness of the Test  
 
 As noted in Table 5.4, there are significant main effects for ER, RiskT and three 
significant interactions that contain RiskT that are significant: ER x RiskT (F=11.01; p=.001), 
Focus x RiskT (F=13.67; p=.000), and ER x FOCUS x RiskT (F = 6.28; p = 0.008).27  It is the 
significant ER x FOCUS x RiskT that is relevant for H3a and H3b. 
 H3a predicts that when RiskT is low, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will 
be higher in the balanced FOCUS condition regardless of the level of engagement risk.  This 
suggests that the ER x FOCUS interaction will not be significant and that FOCUS will be 
significant across both levels of ER. Figure 5.3 (Panel A) plots the adjusted means when RiskT is 
low.28  The effect of ER x FOCUS is insignificant (F = 1.02; p = .316) and FOCUS is significant 
and in the correct direction (adjusted means for balance focus = 6.89 v. effectiveness focus = 
6.00; F = 6.00; p = .017).  Follow up tests show that while the effect of FOCUS is significantly 
positive when ER is High (adjusted means for balanced focus = 5.90 v. 4.64 in the effectiveness 
focus; t =2.47; p=.019), the effect of FOCUS is not significant (although in the correct direction) 
when ER is Low (adjusted means for balanced focus = 7.87 v. 7.35 for the effectiveness focus;    
t = 1.01; p=.320). Thus, H3a is partially supported. My findings for H3a shows that when the 
riskiness of the tests is low and engagement is low that external auditors rely equally on the 
internal audit function regardless of the focus of the PCAOB inspection, but when engagement 
                                                 
27 There are other interaction terms that are significant (ER x FOCUS x TT and FOCUS x RiskT x TT). However, 
these terms relate to TT and H4, not H3a or H3b. These effects are discussed later. 
28 The full results for this test and similar ones are not tabulated. 
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risk is high, the external auditors rely more on the internal audit function when the focus of the 
PCAOB inspection process is balanced.  
H3b predicts that when the riskiness of the test is high, the auditors’ reliance on the 
internal audit function will be higher in the balanced focus condition but only when engagement 
risk is low. When engagement risk is high, there will be no difference between the auditors’ 
reliance on the internal audit function across the two focuses of the PCAOB inspection process. 
This suggests that the ER x FOCUS interaction will be significant and that the effect of FOCUS 
will only be significant when ER is low. Figure 5.3 (Panel B) plots the means. The effect of ER x 
FOCUS is significant (F = 3.25; p = .038, one-tailed).  However, the effect of FOCUS overall is 
also significant (adjusted means for balance condition = 5.22 v. 3.00 in the effectiveness 
condition; F = 61.02; p = .000).  Follow up tests show that the effect of FOCUS is significant 
when ER is Low (adjusted means for balanced focus = 6.06 v. 3.32 in the effectiveness focus; t = 
5.85; p=.000) and when ER is High (adjusted means for balanced focus = 4.38 v. 2.69 in the 
effectiveness focus; t =5.55; p=.000). Thus, H3b is partially supported. Thus, my findings for H3b 
hold when ER is low but not when ER is high. Overall, the results for H3b indicate that when the 
riskiness of the tests is high that auditors rely on the internal audit function more when the focus 
of the PCAOB inspection process is balanced regardless of the level of engagement risk. 
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Figure 5.3:  Two-way interaction for Riskiness of the Tests 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
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5.7   Hypothesis 4 – Type of Tests 
 H4 predicts that auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function will be greater for tests of 
controls than for substantive procedures.  Table 5.4 shows a significant main effect for TT 
(F=35.316, p = 000). As predicted, the adjusted mean for test of controls (5.98) is higher than the 
adjusted mean for substantive procedures (4.85) (t-test = 5.76; p = .000).  Thus, H4 is supported.  
However, there are three significant interaction terms that contain TT and potentially moderate 
the main effect: FOCUS x TT (F = 6.830; p = .011), ER x FOCUS x TT (F=5.624, p=.021), and 
FOCUS x RiskT x TT (F = 4.8; p = .36). Thus, I conduct post hoc analysis. 29 
I first analyze the three way interaction ER x FOCUS x TT by conducting simple effects 
tests of the interaction of ER x FOCUS by each level of TT. Under both TT conditions, the 
interaction of ER x FOCUS was not significant (TC: F = 1.26; p = .266; SP:  F = 2.32; p =.133).  
Figure 5.4 (Panel A) plots the means for TC.  For the tests of controls condition, the balanced 
focus always dominates the effectiveness focus.  For low engagement risk, the mean in the 
balanced condition (7.48) is significantly higher than in the effectiveness condition (5.80) 
(F=15.82; p=.000). When engagement risk is high, the mean for the balanced condition (6.21) is 
significantly higher than the mean in the effectiveness condition (3.81) (F=24.37; p=.000). When 
using test of controls, I find that the external auditors rely significantly more on the internal audit 
function when the PCAOB inspection focus is balanced compared to an effectiveness focus 
regardless of the level of engagement risk.  
Figure 5.4 (Panel B) plots the means for the substantive procedures condition.  In the 
substantive procedures condition, focus of the PCAOB inspection did not have the same impact 
on the auditors’ reliance decisions as in the test of controls.  For low engagement risk, the mean 
                                                 
29 I also split the full model and examined the dependent variables for each type of test separately.  The results were qualitatively 
the same.  
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in the balanced condition (6.45) is moderately significant compared to the effectiveness 
condition (4.87) (F = 8.63; p = .06).  In the high engagement risk condition, the mean in the 
balanced condition (4.07) is not significantly different than the mean in the effectiveness 
condition (3.52) (F = 1.92; p = .175).  Thus, when considering reliance on the internal audit 
function to perform substantive procedures, auditors’ reliance decisions depend on the level of 
engagement risk and not the focus of the inspection as in the tests of controls. 
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Figure 5.4:  Two-way interaction for Type of the Tests 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Next, I examine the significant three-way interaction between FOCUS x RiskT x TT by 
conducting simple effects tests of the interaction of FOCUS x RiskT by each level of TT. For 
tests of control condition, the interaction of FOCUS x RiskT was not significant (F =1.14; p 
=.289), but it was significant for substantive procedures (F =13.50; p =.000). 
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Figure 5.5 (Panel A) plots the adjusted means. For the test of controls condition, the low 
RiskT condition always dominates the high RiskT condition. In the balanced condition, the mean 
in the low RiskT condition (6.00) is significantly greater than the mean in the high RiskT 
condition (3.55) (F=38.90; p=.000). Similarly, in the effectiveness condition, the mean for the 
low RiskT condition (7.88) is significantly greater than the mean in the high RiskT condition 
(5.94) (F=43.35; p=.000).   Auditors’ reliance decisions for tests of controls are always higher 
when the riskiness of the test is low regardless of the focus of the PCAOB inspection.  
Figure 5.5 (Panel B) plots the means for the substantive procedures condition. In the 
balanced condition, the mean in the low RiskT condition (5.90) is significantly greater than the 
mean in the high RiskT condition (2.44) (F=81.65; p=.000). In the effectiveness condition, the 
mean for the low RiskT condition (6.10) was significantly greater than the mean in the high 
RiskT condition (4.66) (F=13.95; p=.001). Again, it appears that the riskiness of the test 
dominates in both the balanced and effectiveness focus conditions for substantive procedures.  
I next examine the riskiness of the tests across focus conditions, the means for the low RiskT 
condition between the effectiveness condition (5.90) and the balanced condition (6.10) was not 
significantly different (F = .14; p = .707). However, the means in the high RiskT condition 
between effectiveness condition (2.44) and balanced condition (4.66) were significantly different 
(F = 22.38; p = .000).  Thus, when using substantive tests, I find that the auditors’ reliance 
decisions when the riskiness of the test is low were not impacted by the focus of the inspection, 
but were impacted when the riskiness of the test is high. In the high RiskT condition, the auditors 
relied more on the internal audit function when the focus of the PCAOB inspection process was 
balanced. 
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 To summarize, H4 predicted there would be a difference between the auditors’ reliance 
decisions on the test of controls and the substantive procedures.  This was supported.  However, 
the presence of interaction terms moderated this finding. Post hoc analysis showed that when 
planning test of controls, auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function was always greater 
when the riskiness of the test was low, engagement risk was low, and the focus of the PCAOB 
inspection process was balanced. However, the auditors’ reliance decisions when planning 
substantive procedures shows the following. First, when considering reliance on the internal 
audit function to perform substantive procedures, auditors’ reliance decisions depend on the level 
of engagement risk and not the focus of the inspection. Second, when riskiness of the substantive 
test is low, the auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function was not impacted by the focus of 
the PCAOB inspection process. Third, when the riskiness of the substantive test was high, the 
auditors relied more on the internal audit function when the focus of the PCAOB’s inspection 
process was balanced. 
Section 5.2 through 5.7 provides support that engagement risk, focus of the inspection, 
riskiness of the test, and the type of test impact auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit 
function.  The impact of each depended on the conditions the auditor faced when making their 
reliance decisions.   
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Figure 5.5:  Two-way interaction for Type of Tests 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
5.8  Conclusions 
 Chapter 5 describes the statistical analysis performed to test Hypotheses 1 through 4.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that as engagement risk increases, auditors’ reliance decisions on the 
internal audit function will decrease.  I find support for my hypothesis.  Hypothesis 2 predicts 
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that the lower the riskiness of the test, the more reliance the auditors will place on the internal 
audit function and I find support for this prediction.  Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict a three-way 
interaction between engagement risk, focus of the inspection, and the riskiness of the test.  I find 
partial support for these two hypotheses.  Lastly, Hypothesis 4 predicts that auditors’ reliance on 
the internal audit function should differ based on the type of test that is being used.  I do find 
support for this prediction.  I find that auditors’ reliance on the internal audit function is greater 
for tests of controls than for substantive procedures.  I also find that when planning test of 
controls, auditors’ reliance decisions are greater when the riskiness of the test and engagement 
risk are low and the focus of the PCAOB inspection process is a more balanced approach.  
However; when planning substantive procedures, auditors’ reliance decisions depend on the 
engagement risk level and not the focus of the inspection.  When riskiness of the substantive test 
is low, the auditors’ reliance decisions are not impacted by the focus of the inspection.  When the 
riskiness of the substantive test was high, auditors’ reliance decisions are greater under the 
balanced focus of inspection versus the effectiveness focus.  Chapter 6 concludes this 
dissertation with a discussion of results, contributions, limitation, and avenues for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate how auditors’ reliance decisions on the 
internal audit function will be affected by the competing pressures from different inspection 
focuses, varying levels of engagement risk, and the level of risk associated with an audit test.  
This chapter concludes this dissertation with a summary of results in Section 6.1, a discussion of 
the contributions in Section 6.2, and an evaluation of the limitations and suggestions for future 
research in Section 6.3. 
6.1 Summary of Results  
My findings suggest that auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function are 
impacted by different inspection focuses, varying levels of engagement risk, and the level of the 
risk associated with the audit test.  I examined two differing PCAOB inspection focuses (one on 
effectiveness only and one on a more balanced approach between effectiveness and efficiency); 
two different engagement risk levels (low and high); two levels of the riskiness of the tests (low 
and high); and two types of tests (tests of controls and substantive procedures).    
Overall, I find that as engagement risk and/or riskiness of the test increased, auditors’ 
reliance decisions decreased, but the interesting finding is how auditors’ reliance decisions were 
affected by the interaction between engagement risk, PCAOB inspection focus, and riskiness of 
the test.  When riskiness of the tests is low and engagement risk is high, the external auditors rely 
more on the internal audit function when the focus of the PCAOB inspection process is balanced. 
However, when engagement risk is low, the external auditors rely equally on the internal audit 
function regardless of the focus of the PCAOB inspection.  When the riskiness of the tests is 
high, I find that the external auditors also rely significantly more on the internal audit function 
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when the PCAOB inspection focus is balanced compared to an effectiveness focus regardless of 
the level of engagement risk.   Lastly, I find that there is a difference between the auditors’ 
reliance decisions on the test of controls and the substantive procedures.  Overall, auditors’ rely 
more on the internal audit function for tests of controls than substantive procedures.  Some 
interesting differences, however, were identified. When using test of controls, external auditors  
rely more on the internal audit function when the focus of the inspection is a more balanced 
approach, the riskiness of the test and engagement risk are low as compared to when the focus of 
inspection is effectiveness only, or the riskiness of the test and engagement risk are high.  
External auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function, when using substantive 
procedures, depend on the engagement risk level and not the focus of the inspection.  When the 
riskiness of the substantive test is low, the focus of the inspection does not have an impact on the 
auditors’ reliance decision.  When riskiness of the substantive test is high, auditors’ reliance in 
the balanced focus of inspection is higher than the effectiveness focus.     
6.2  Contributions 
This dissertation has important implications for auditors, regulators, academics and other 
interested stakeholders.  First, it extends the research on the PCAOB’s inspection process and 
how it influences auditors’ reliance decisions on the work of others (i.e., the internal audit 
function).  Thus, this study extends the internal audit literature by examining how the inspection 
process by the PCAOB affects auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal auditor function 
(Gramling 1999, Felix et al. 2001, Felix et al. 2005.  Under the balanced focus of the inspection, 
auditors’ rely more on the internal audit function than under an effectiveness focus across 
differing levels of engagement risk and riskiness of tests.  Second, policy setters for external 
auditors may wish to consider the focus they are using for their inspections, the selection process 
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for audit inspections, and its impact on external auditors reliance decisions.  AS5 allows the 
external auditor to rely more on the work of others when conducting an audit of ICFR.  My 
findings suggest that auditors’ rely more on the internal audit function when using tests of 
controls than substantive procedures.  Possible unintended consequences from this regulatory 
change is that even under higher engagement risk and higher riskiness of tests, auditors’ may rely 
more on the internal audit function when faced with the balanced inspection focus versus the 
effectiveness inspection focus.  Third, auditors face increased pressure to maintain a high level of 
effectiveness while increasing the efficiency of their audits. My findings suggest that auditors 
under high levels of engagement risk still relied more on the internal audit function under the 
balanced inspection focus versus the effectiveness inspection focus, but the riskiness of the tests 
also impacted the level of the auditors’ reliance.  Lastly, this study extends the research on how 
engagement risk influences auditors’ decision-making behavior (e.g., Knapp 1985; Walo 1995; 
Hackenbrack & Nelson 1996; Johnstone 2000) by examining engagement risk under the new 
regulatory pressures of the PCAOB inspection process.      
6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 Experiments abstract from the real world and sacrifice some external validity (Bonner 
1999).  To mitigate external validity issues, I performed a thorough experimental analysis.  
Nonetheless, this dissertation has several limitations.  First, results are generalizable only to the 
extent that experimental participants are representative of the population of external auditors that 
make reliance decisions on the internal audit function.  Second, I focused my research on only 
two levels of the focus for the PCAOB inspection process.  Future research should look at other 
possibilities.  Third, engagement risk was set at the extremes (either high or low).  In the real 
world, auditors face a continuum of engagement risk levels.  Future research should investigate 
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how the levels of the engagement risk interact with the level of the focus of the PCAOB.  Fourth, 
I was limited to choosing only eight procedures for auditors to make reliance decisions.  The 
results may not hold for other audit procedures or tests.  
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
 
 
The following pages show the computer screen appearance for the entire experimental 
instrument for Case 1 where the manipulation for engagement risk was low and the PCAOB 
inspection focus was on effectiveness.  The manipulations that were used in Case 2 through 4 for 
the Suntek Case are included after the final page of Case 1.   
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On the next two pages you will be asked to rate the riskiness of the test of controls and audit 
procedures that you previously evaluated for the reliance on the work of the internal audit function. 
These ratings should be considered independent of the ratings for the reliance decision. In rating the 
test of controls and audit procedures, you should consider their riskiness in terms of the assertion(s) 
being tested for SunTek along a continuum from low to high risk.  
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Manipulation between different instruments: 
 
Engagement Risk (High): 
 
Company Overview: 
SunTek Inc. is a leading developer of digital laser imaging and chemistry-free plate technologies 
for the printing and graphic arts industries. SunTek is a large publicly traded company. SunTek 
developed and recently began selling an innovative new product. The company started selling the 
product in October of the prior year. Although initial sales were encouraging, the company was 
narrowly in compliance with restrictive debt covenants from which waivers had been obtained in 
the past. Also, management bonuses are tied to sales targets and the client just did meet these 
sales targets. Key financial ratios for the current year are below industry average as were the 
prior year ratios. The company has been an audit client of the firm for the past two years. 
 
Engagement risk is defined as the risk that the audit firm is exposed to loss or injury from 
litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with the integrated audited 
financial statements (AU 312.02). Your firm has assessed engagement risk as “HIGH.” 
 
 
PCAOB inspection focus (Balanced): 
 
PCAOB Inspection: 
Your firm is scheduled for its annual inspection by the PCAOB. Because of the nature of your 
firm’s clients, the PCAOB will use a BALANCED approach when conducting their inspection of 
the firm’s integrated audits. Thus, the PCAOB inspection team will concentrate its efforts to 
assess whether the significant risk areas have been properly evaluated, concluded upon, and 
documented. The PCAOB inspectors will also focus on use of the work of others (i.e., internal 
audit function) related to the audit of internal control over financial reporting. This change is 
intended to lead to a more efficient audit of internal control over financial reporting. 
 
At this time it is uncertain that the SunTek audit will be selected for review by the PCAOB. 
 
